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Two Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences
By YAIR ANTLER
We modify the stable matching problem by allowing agents’ preferences
to depend on the endogenous actions of agents on the other side of the
market. Conventional matching theory results break down in the modi-
fied setup. In particular, every game that is induced by a stable matching
mechanism (e.g. the Gale-Shapley mechanism) may have equilibria that
result in matchings which are not stable w.r.t the agents’ endogenous
preferences. However, when the Gale-Shapley mechanism is slightly
modified, every equilibrium of its induced game results in a pairwise
stable matching w.r.t the endogenous preferences as long as they satisfy
a natural reciprocity property.
JEL: C72, C78, D82
The conventional mechanism design literature implicitly assumes that there is no link
between the preference environment and the institutional setting. In many circumstances,
this is a restrictive assumption since agents may be either embarrassed or admired as a
result of the preferences, actions and opinions revealed by a mechanism. For example,
consider the problem of eliciting agents’ opinions: An agent might be embarrassed if
it is stated publicly that his opinion differs from those of other agents. This may affect
agents’ considerations and the properties of the mechanism’s result. In recent years,
some researchers have relaxed this assumption and have allowed agents’ preferences to
be linked to the mechanism. Among them are Glazer and Rubinstein (1998), Bierbrauer
and Netzer (2012) and Gradwohl (2013). The analysis presented here continues this line
of research and focuses on two-sided matching.
We relax the above-mentioned assumption and generalize the one-to-one stable match-
ing problem. In the conventional problem, there is a set of men and a set of women,
each of whom has strict preferences defined over agents on the other side of the market.
The agents’ preferences are common knowledge among themselves but are unknown
to a planner. The planner chooses a mechanism in order to match the two sides of the
market such that the matching is pairwise stable (hereafter: stable) w.r.t the agents’ pref-
erences. A well-known result (see Roth (1984) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985)) is that
the set of stable matchings is Nash equilibrium with undominated strategies (hereafter:
equilibrium) implemented by the game that is induced by the Gale-Shapley mechanism
(hereafter, GSM). We attempt to obtain an analogous result when agents’ preferences are
endogenous.
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To illustrate the model, consider the game induced by the GSM. In this game, agents’
messages are stated rankings of agents on the other side of the market, which we interpret
as public statements. For example, suppose that Alice, Bob and Dan are participating
in this game. If Alice submits a ranking in which Bob is ranked above Dan, then this is
interpreted as a public statement that she likes Bob better than Dan. The desirability of
an agent depends on his/her stated ranking. For example, in the case that Bob submits a
ranking in which Alice is his first choice, he might become more attractive in her eyes.
Conversely, if he submits a ranking in which she is an unacceptable match (i.e. he states
that he prefers being single over matching with her), it could make him less attractive to
her.
In the above example, each agent’s message space consists of rankings of agents on
the other side of the market. Moreover, if agent i assigns a relatively high rank to agent
j , this can be interpreted as a statement of j’s desirability. Note that the same statement
may be interpreted differently given different outcome functions or message spaces. In
other words, our interpretation of a message in terms of the desirability of another agent
depends on the matching mechanism.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that the model presented below is one of com-
plete information such that agents’ preferences are common knowledge among the agents.
The messages sent as part of the mechanism are known to the mechanism’s participants
and an audience of outside observers who see the messages as "signals" of the agents’
true preferences. The existence of outside observers accounts in part for the agents’ pref-
erences though they are not modelled explicitly. The idea of outside observers who affect
agents’ considerations appears in Gradwohl (2013) in the context of privacy concerns.
In a different context, an agent may have to justify his choice or preferences to an out-
side observer (see Spiegler (2002)). For example, suppose that Alice and Bob are two
agents taking part in some matching process and that the mechanism matches Alice to
Bob. Bob may need to justify his actions or his feelings towards Alice to his parents and
friends, which will be harder to do if Alice’s action is interpreted as a negative statement
about Bob’s desirability (for example, if she has ranked him relatively low).
Besides romantic relationships, there are other environments in which it is reasonable
to assume that messages enter into agents’ considerations in this manner. For example,
in the labor market a worker who is ranked low by a firm may have a sense of inferiority
among his colleagues who will realize that he was ranked low though they do not know
the firm’s true preferences. The parent of a child who was put on a waiting list before
finally being admitted to a school may be upset by this and prefer sending him to another
school. In professional American football, if a player declares in public that he does not
want to play for a specific team this may affect the draft choice considerations of that
team’s manager.1 Although the player’s preferences are known to the manager (since
teams invest a great deal of resources in scouting and observing players), they are un-
known to the team’s fans who are only aware of the player’s declaration. Thus, the fans
1For example, there is the case of Eli Manning who was the most prominent player of the 2004 NFL draft class.
Manning publically stated that he would refuse to play for the San Diego Chargers (who held the rights to the first overall
draft pick).
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may change their opinion of the player as a result of his declaration. It will be costly for
the manager to explain to the fans why he would nonetheless like to select this player,
which makes the player less attractive to him.
Since agents’ preferences depend on the matching mechanism and are therefore en-
dogenous, the notions of stability and equilibrium need to be clarified. Stability is treated
as an ex post criterion since a planner would not want to give agents an incentive to chal-
lenge a prescribed match. Thus, we are interested in stability w.r.t the agents’ preferences
after the statements have been made. The standard notion of Nash equilibrium is used.
A profile of strategies is an equilibrium if each agent’s strategy is a best response (w.r.t
the endogenous preferences that are generated by the profile of strategies) to the profile
of strategies made by the other agents.
It is first shown that in the absence of restrictions on the structure of preferences, each
game that is induced by an individually rational matching mechanism may have equilib-
ria that result in unstable matchings (w.r.t the endogenous preferences that result from
these equilibria). Restrictions are imposed on the formation of preferences such that if
agent i’s action expresses that he desires agent j , then as a result agent i will become
more attractive to agent j . A general criterion that makes it possible to compare agents’
actions in this context is provided. It turns out that even under these restrictions on the
preferences formation, several matching theory results do not hold. In particular, each
game that is induced by a stable matching mechanism or a monotonic priority mecha-
nism may have equilibria that result in unstable matchings (w.r.t the agents’ endogenous
preferences).
We propose a new mechanism that is a variant of the GSM, in which each woman
states the name of one man (and is also allowed to state that she prefers to remain un-
matched), while each man announces a strict ranking of the women and the option of
remaining unmatched. The Gale-Shapley algorithm with men making the proposals is
used as an outcome function. A man who was not stated by a particular woman is treated
by the algorithm as if that woman had stated that he is an unacceptable match for her.
This mechanism makes it a weakly dominant strategy for each man to behave as if each
of the women had declared that he is her only choice. Single deviations by women in
the mechanism’s induced game are aligned with pairwise deviations so that the stable
matching problem with endogenous preferences is solved. In other words, each equilib-
rium of this mechanism’s induced matching game results in a stable matching w.r.t the
agents’ endogenous preferences. Moreover, we show that in the conventional setup, in
which agents’ preferences are exogenous, this mechanism preserves the classical GSM’s
properties. It implements the stable correspondence and it is strategy-proof for agents on
one side of the market.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 introduces the general framework. Sec-
tion 2 presents the analysis of the modified stable matching problem when there are no
restrictions on the formation of preferences. In section 3, we impose a structure on the
preferences formation and analyze the problem given this structure. Section 4 concludes.
All proofs are to be found in the appendix.
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I. The general framework
There are two disjoint sets M and W , where M D fm1; :::;mlg is the set of men
and W D fw1; :::; wng is the set of women. A matching  : M [W !M [W is a
one-to-one correspondence such that w D  .m/ if and only if m D  .w/ and for all m
and w either  .w/ 2M or  .w/ D w and either  .m/ 2 W or  .m/ D m. We use
the notation  D  .m; w/ ;m 0; ::: to indicate that in the matching  man m is married
to woman w and man m 0 is single. Let N denote the set of matchings.
A matching mechanism hQ; gi includes a message space Qi for each agent i 2M [
W and an outcome function g : Q ! N , where Q :D i2M[WQi . Let Qi 2 Qi
denote the message of agent i 2M [W and let Q :D .Qi /i2M[W , QM :D .Qi /i2M,
QW :D .Qi /i2W , Q i :D
 Q j j2M[W=fig, QM :D i2MQi , QW :D i2WQi , and
Q i :D  j2M[W=figQ j . For each i 2 M [ W , denote agent i’s spouse, given a
matching mechanism hQ; gi and a profile of messages Q, by gi .Q/. For each m 2M
(w 2W), define Lm (Lw) to be the set of strict linear orderings ofW [ fmg (M [ fwg).
We refer to a matching mechanism in which Qi D Li for each i 2M [W as a ranking
mechanism and we say that agent i states that agent j is unacceptable to him/her if i Qi j .
The novelty of the model is that agents’ preferences now depend on the matching
mechanism. Given a matching mechanism hQ; gi, each man’s strict preferences PQ;gm :
QW ! Lm depend on the profile of messages stated by the women and each woman’s
strict preferences PQ;gw : QM ! Lw depend on the profile of messages stated by the
men. The matching mechanism remains fixed throughout the analysis and therefore we
can omit the superscript Q; g from the preferences description. The following notation
will be useful in what follows: When Q D .QW ;QM/, we will often write Pw .Q/
instead of Pw .QM/ and Pm .Q/ instead of Pm .QW/. Let P .Q/ :D .Pi .Q//i2M[W .
The preferences are defined w.r.t a matching mechanism and not w.r.t a mechanism’s
message space (e.g. rankings of agents on the other side of the market). This is for
two reasons: First, different matching mechanisms may have different message spaces.
Second, different outcome functions induce different interpretations of similar messages
so that the message space is not sufficient for the formation of preferences. For exam-
ple, consider two ranking mechanisms hQ; gi and 
Q; g0 such that g (g0) matches only
couples who stated each other as their first (last) choice. A stated ranking in which
i 2 M [W is the first choice is intuitively interpreted as a positive statement about i
under g but not under g0. Following is the definition of stability in this model:
DEFINITION 1: Given a mechanism hQ; gi and a profile of messages Q 2 Q, a match-
ing g .Q/ is blocked by individual i if i Pi .Q/ gi .Q/. A matching g .Q/ is blocked by the
pair .m; w/ if m 6D gw .Q/, wPm .Q/ gm .Q/ and m Pw .Q/ gw .Q/. A matching is stable
if it is not blocked by any individual or pair of agents.
We use Nash equilibrium with weakly undominated strategies as a solution concept.
Since agents’ preferences are endogenous, the notion of weak domination differs and
more than one preference relation is considered. Formally:
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DEFINITION 2: The strategy Qi weakly dominates the strategy OQi if there is no profile
Q0 i 2 Q i such that gi
 OQi ;Q0 i Pi  Qi ;Q0 i gi  Qi ;Q0 i and there exists a profile
Q0 i 2 Q i such that gi
 Qi ;Q0 i Pi  Qi ;Q0 i gi  OQi ;Q0 i.
DEFINITION 3: An equilibrium of the game hQ; g;Pi is a profile of strategies  Qi i2M[W
such that:
(1) For each i 2M [W , Qi is not weakly dominated by any other strategy Qi 2 Qi .
(2) There is no strategy Qi 2 Qi such that gi
 Qi ;Q i Pi  Qi ;Q i gi  Qi ;Q i.
II. Analysis of the modified stable matching problem
A well-known result presented by Roth (1984) states that when agents’ preferences are
exogenous, every equilibrium of the game induced by the GSM results in a stable match-
ing. We attempt to obtain an analogous result when agents’ preferences are endogenous.
In other words, we look for a matching mechanism hQ; gi such that for any profile of
preferences P, if Q is an equilibrium of the mechanism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi, then
g .Q/ is stable w.r.t P .Q/. We refer to this problem as the modified stable matching
problem. Subsequently, we present a short description of the GSM and a simple example
which demonstrates that Roth’s (1984) result does not hold when agents’ preferences are
endogenous.
The GSM is a ranking mechanism that uses the Gale-Shapley algorithm as an outcome
function. The following description of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is taken from Roth
and Sotomayor (1990). To start, each man proposes to the first woman on his preference
list of acceptable women. Each woman rejects the proposal of any man who is unaccept-
able to her, and if she receives more than one proposal from acceptable men, she rejects
all but the one she most prefers. Any man whose proposal has not been rejected at this
point is kept "engaged". At any step any man whose proposal has been rejected in the
previous step proposes to his next choice, as long as there remains an acceptable woman
to whom he has not yet proposed. If at any step of the algorithm a man has already
proposed to, and been rejected by, all of the women he finds acceptable, then he issues
no further proposals. Each woman receiving proposals rejects any from unacceptable
men, and also rejects all but her most preferred among the group consisting of the new
proposers together with any man she may have kept engaged from the previous step.
The algorithm stops and marriages are consummated after any step in which no man is
rejected.
EXAMPLE 1: Let M D fmg, W D fwg and consider the GSM. Let Pw .Qm/ D Qm
and Pm .Qw/ D Qw. In other words, man m wants to be matched with woman w if and
only if she states that she does not want to be matched with him (Qw D .w;m/) and
the same applies for woman w. The strategies Qw D .w;m/ and Qm D .m; w/ form
a unique equilibrium of the game that is induced by the GSM regardless of which side
of the market makes the proposals. To see this, note that by the individual rationality
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property of the mechanism neither agent can gain by a deviation and that in the only
situation in which i 2 fm; wg can influence the resulting matching i is better off single.
In the matching  that results from this equilibrium, both agents are single but prefer
being matched to each other and therefore .m; w/ blocks .
The preferences appearing in Example 1 are not intuitive but are nonetheless used be-
cause they keep the analysis straightforward and clearly illustrate two issues. First, they
demonstrate the importance of imposing a structure on the formation of preferences. Sec-
ond, they demonstrate the intuition behind the failure of individually rational matching
mechanisms when agents’ preferences are endogenous. We formalize this intuition in
proposition 1.
DEFINITION 4: An individually rational matching mechanism is a matching mecha-
nism hQ; gi such that for each i 2 M [W there exists a message Qi 2 Qi such that
gi .Qi ;Q i / D i for each Q i 2 Q i .
PROPOSITION 1: For each individually rational matching mechanism hQ; gi, there
exists a profile of messages Q and a profile of preferences P such that Q is an equilib-
rium of the mechanism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
Although example 1 implies that without any restriction on the preferences formation
the GSM cannot solve the modified stable matching problem, it is worthwhile asking
whether there are markets in which a planner can use this mechanism and be sure that
each of the equilibria of its induced game results in a stable matching (w.r.t the endoge-
nous preferences). In what follows, we show that in cases in which only one side of the
market includes agents whose preferences depend on the institutional setting, the answer
to this question is positive.
One-Sided Social Preferences
We focus on cases in which only one side of the market includes agents whose prefer-
ences are endogenous (and, without loss of generality, we assume that men’s preferences
are not sensitive to the mechanism). This structure describes a situation in which the two
sides of the market are not symmetric. For example, if one side of the market consists of
firms and the other of workers, then there are situations in which firms are not affected
by the mechanism, but workers are. Prior to the analysis, we present a lemma that will
be helpful in what follows. It involves a straightforward proof that a result similar to
the one proven by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) holds in our modified
environment.
LEMMA 1: Let hQ,g,Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making the
proposals and suppose that for a man m 2 M, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D NPm for each
Q;Q0 2 Q. Then, Qm D NPm (i.e. truthful revelation of m’s preferences) weakly domi-
nates any other strategy Q0m 2 Qm .
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We use this lemma to prove a simple result which states that if the side of the market
making the proposals is chosen carefully, then every matching that is a result of an equi-
librium of the GSM’s induced game is stable w.r.t the agents’ endogenous preferences.
This claim uses standard matching theory arguments.
PROPOSITION 2: Let hQ,g;Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making
the proposals and suppose that for each m 2M and Q;Q0 2 Q, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D
Pm . If Q is an equilibrium of hQ,g;Pi, then g .Q/ is stable w.r.t P .Q/.
To see the intuition behind the proof, note that according to lemma 1 each man truth-
fully reveals his preferences in each equilibrium. Since there is only one relevant pro-
file of men’s strategies, the market collapses to a conventional marriage market and the
classic matching theory arguments are applicable. Note that if women are making the
proposals, dominant strategies need not exist and the stability of matchings produced in
equilibria of the game induced by the GSM is not guaranteed.
III. Positive reciprocity
Two restrictions are now imposed on the preferences formation. Broadly speaking, the
first restriction allows us to capture the idea that if agent i’s message expresses that he
(she) desires agent j , then this makes him (her) more attractive to j . The second restric-
tion implies that the relative ranking of any two agents depends only on their messages.
Formally:
DEFINITION 5: Let i 2 I, J 6D I and I;J 2 fM;Wg. Given a matching mechanism
hQ; gi, the message Qi 2 Qi is at least as favorable to agent j 2 J as the message
Q0i 2 Qi if for each Q i 2 Q i , gi
 Q0i ;Q i D j implies gi .Qi ;Q i / D j .
 A preferences profile P satisfies monotonici t y if i Pj .Qi ;Q i / i 0 implies i Pj
 Q0i ;Q i i 0
whenever Q0i is at least as favorable to j as Qi for each i 2 I, i 0 2 I [ f jg,
j 2 J 6D I and I;J 2 fM;Wg.
 A preferences profile P satisfies independence if the following two conditions are
met for each i 2 I , j 2 J 6D I and I;J 2 fM;Wg:
– For any two message profiles Q;Q0 2 Q such that Qi D Q0i and Qi 0 D Q0i 0 ,
i Pj .Q/ i 0 if and only if i Pj
 Q0 i 0.
– For any two message profiles Q;Q0 2 Q such that Qi D Q0i , i Pj .Q/ j if and
only if i Pj
 Q0 j .
Social psychologists have presented experimental evidence that broadly supports the
assumptions we make regarding preferences formation. Aronson and Worchel (1966),
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Curtis and Kim (1986) and Condon and Crano (1988) presented subjects with false ev-
idence that other subjects have indicated that they like them. As a result, the "liked"
subjects favored these other subjects and gave them more positive evaluations.2
Below are some examples of matching mechanisms, their interpretation and the com-
parability of different messages according to favorability for each example. First, we
consider the GSM, which is used in our benchmark result (Roth, 1984).
EXAMPLE 2: Let hQ; gi denote the GSM with men making the proposals and consider
two possible messages of woman w, Qw and Q0w. Suppose that m Qww and m Q0ww.
Then, the message Qw is at least as favorable to m as Q0w if and only if Bm
 Q0w 
Bm .Qw/, where Bm .Qw/ D

m 0 2M : m Qwm 0
	
. Suppose that m Qww and wQ0wm.
Then, Qw is clearly at least as favorable to m as Q0w. Note that not all messages are
comparable according to favorability. In particular, a message Qw, which declares that
m is w’s xth choice, is not necessarily at least as favorable to m as a message Q0w,
which declares that m is w’s yth choice for 1 < x < y. To see this, suppose that there
are two men m 0 and m 00 such that m 0 (m 00) is stated to be w’s first (last) choice under
Qw and w’s last (first) choice under Q0w. The two messages are not comparable w.r.t
each man m 2 M= m 0;m 00	 and therefore man m’s preferences are not restricted by
monotonici t y in this case. The men’s messages are comparable in a symmetric manner.
In the next example, we consider a bidding mechanism in which each man has a budget
that he allocates among the women. Each woman states whether she is willing to be
matched. One can interpret the men as students who are bidding for seminar participation
and the women as professors who are to decide whether to give the seminar or not. In
this context, a professor might be either embarrassed or admired if the sum of the bids
for his course is publicly revealed.
EXAMPLE 3: In this bidding mechanism, each m 2M assigns a real number xmw  0
to each woman w 2 W such that Pw2W xmw D 1. Each woman w 2 W declares her
decision Qw 2 fyes; nog. Let W1 D fw 2W : Qw D yesg, M1 D M. At each step
k D 1; 2; ::: the mechanism’s outcome function matches one couple by choosing the
highest bid xmw made by a man m 2Mk for a woman w 2Wk (with ties broken by the
agents’ indices), matches w with m and removes them from the lists of available agents,
such that MkC1 DMk= fmg and WkC1 DWk= fwg. The outcome function stops at step
h, at whichWh D ; orMh D ;.
When jWj  3, not all of the men’s strategies are comparable according to favorability.
For example, suppose that W D fw1; w2; w3g. The bidding strategy .0; 0:45; 0:55/ is
(not) at least as favorable to w3 (w2) as the bidding strategy .0:1; 0:4; 0:5/. As for the
women’s strategies, for each m 2 M, yes is at least as favorable for m as no. The
model’s behavioral assumption implies that if a professor states that she wants to give
a seminar, it could make her seminar more attractive to students, while the opposite is
impossible.
2A caveat in the use of these studies as evidence in our context is that the effect of signaling cannot be isolated from
the intrinsic reciprocity.
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The next example involves a serial dictatorship mechanism which illustrates that "cheap
talk" has no influence on the formation of preferences according to our criterion.
EXAMPLE 4: The serial dictatorship mechanism hQ; gi operates in stages. At each
stage k D 1; 2; ::: the outcome function assigns woman wk her first-ranked man among
the men who are available at stage k. In this mechanism, each pair of men’s strategies
Qm and Q0m are degenerately comparable by favorability since they do not have any
strategic meaning. It follows that the women’s profile of preferences is constant under
this mechanism.
Since we have imposed a limiting structure on the formation of preferences, it is ap-
propriate to check whether Roth’s (1984) result holds under these restrictions. Example
5 shows that it does not.
EXAMPLE 5: Consider the GSM with men making the proposals and letM D fm1;m2;m3g,
W D fw1; w2; w3g. Let Pm1 D .w1; w2; w3;m1/, Pw1 D .m1;m2;m3; w1/,
Pm2 .Q/ D

w1; w2; w3;m2 if Qw2 D .m2; :::/





w1; w3; w2;m3 if Qw3 D .m3; :::/















According to this profile, there is a "consensus" among the agents regarding the two
agents .m1,w1/ and each i 2 fm2;m3; w2; w3g gives a "bonus" to one of the agents for
publicly ranking him first. This profile satisfies monotonici t y and independence. The
following profile of strategies Q forms an equilibrium of the mechanism’s induced game:
Qm1 D .w1; w2; w3;m1/, Qm2 D .w1; w2; w3;m2/, Qm3 D .w1; w3; w2;m3/, Qw1 D
.m1;m2;m3; w1/, Qw2 D .m1;m2;m3; w2/, Qw3 D .m1;m3;m2; w3/. The matching
resulting from Q is g .Q/ D ..m1; w1/ ; .m2; w2/ ; .m3; w3//, which is blocked by
.m2; w3/ and .m3; w2/. To see that there are no profitable deviations from Q, note that
by the stability property of the mechanism no agent can do better. None of the strategies
in use in Q is dominated by an argument similar to the one used in proposition 3.
The GSM allows m2;m3; w2; w3 to coordinate on an unstable Nash equilibrium. In
a world with no motives related to the matching process, the exclusion of dominated
strategies implies that men state their true preferences (see Dubins and Freedman (1981)
and Roth (1982)), which rules out these unstable equilibria. The motives in the model
presented here eliminate the men’s dominant strategies and enable coordination on such
unstable equilibria.
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The following result states not only that the GSM fails to solve the modified stable
matching problem, but also that no other stable matching mechanism can do so. Al-
though they are not strategy-proof, it is beneficial to explore this class of mechanisms
since it has received a great deal of attention, both in matching theory and in practice.3
In order to prove proposition 3, we introduce a profile of preferences and a profile of
strategies inspired by example 5, such that the profile of strategies is an equilibrium of
any stable matching mechanism’s induced game and results in a matching that is not
stable w.r.t the endogenous preferences induced by it.
DEFINITION 6: A stable matching mechanism is a ranking mechanism hQ; gi such
that for each Q 2 Q, g .Q/ is stable w.r.t Q.
PROPOSITION 3: Let jMj ; jWj  3. For each stable matching mechanism hQ; gi,
there exists a profile of strategies Q and a profile of preferences P that satisfies monotonic-
ity and independence such that Q is an equilibrium of the mechanism’s induced game
hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
Ergin and Sonmez (2006) provide a result which is similar to that of Roth (1984).
They show that although the Boston mechanism, which is a monotonic priority matching
mechanism, is not a stable matching mechanism, the game induced by it Nash equilib-
rium with undominated strategies implements the stable correspondence when agents’
preferences are exogenous. The following proposition states that when agents’ pref-
erences are endogenous, a matching that results from an equilibrium of a game that
is induced by a monotonic priority matching mechanism need not be stable even if
monotonici t y and independence are satisfied by the agents’ preferences.
A priority matching mechanism is a ranking mechanism. We adopt Ergin and Son-
mez’s (2006) framework and define a .k; l/match to be one between a man and a woman
such that the man submits a ranking in which the woman is ranked kth and the woman
submits a ranking in which the man is ranked lth. Given a marriage market with n men
and m women, a match priority is a one-to-one function  : f1; :::; ng  f1; :::;mg !
f1; :::; nmg. A priority matching mechanism determines its outcome in nm steps:
 Step 1: Form any feasible and acceptable  1 .1/ match.
 Step 2: Form any feasible and acceptable  1 .2/ match.
 :::
 Step nm: Form any feasible and acceptable  1 .nm/ match.
A match priority  is monotonic if .k; l/   k 0; l 0 implies  .k; l/    k 0; l 0. A
priority matching mechanism is monotonic if it is induced by a monotonic match priority.
3Stable matching mechanisms are not strategy-proof even in the conventional setting.
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PROPOSITION 4: Let jMj ; jWj  3. For each monotonic priority matching mech-
anism hQ; gi, there exists a profile of strategies Q and a profile of preferences P that
satisfies monotonicity and independence such that Q is an equilibrium of the mecha-
nism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
The intuition behind Ergin and Sonmez’s implementation result is that for one side
of the market truthful revelation is a dominant strategy, so that in equilibrium agents
on that side of the market must use this dominant strategy. The existence of matching-
process-related motives eliminates dominant strategies and allows agents to coordinate
on an equilibrium that results in an unstable matching.
The modified Gale-Shapley mechanism
In this subsection, we solve the modified stable matching problem using a modified
GSM which we denote by

 NQ; Ng. The mechanism is specified as follows: For each
m 2M, let NQm D Lm and for each w 2 W let NQw DM [ fwg. In other words, in the
modified GSM each man states a strict ranking of the women and the option of remaining
unmatched and each woman states at most one man who is an acceptable match for her.
Let Ng be the Gale-Shapley algorithm (with men making the proposals) such that for each
w 2 W the algorithm considers only Qw 2 NQw as an acceptable match for w. Note
that the modified GSM is not a stable matching mechanism since it only considers the
women’s stated first choices.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that Q is an equilibrium of the game that is induced by the
modified GSM 
 NQ; Ng;P. If P satisfies monotonici t y and independence, then Ng .Q/ is
stable w.r.t P .Q/.
It turns out that the modified GSM solves the stable matching problem when agents’
preferences are endogenous. Although at first glance it would appear that the message
space of ranking mechanisms is not sufficiently rich to express the agents’ endogenous
preferences which results in the failure of conventional matching mechanisms, impos-
ing additional restrictions on the message space does solve the modified stable matching
problem. These restrictions prevent women from making statements that are not neces-
sary for the matching process. In addition, they make it a dominant strategy for men to
behave as in the most optimistic scenario, in which they are every woman’s stated first
choice.
In a similar manner, whenever monotonici t y and independence are satisfied by
agents on both sides of the market, one can solve the modified stable matching problem
with a mechanism that restricts the message space of men and uses the Gale-Shapley
algorithm with women making the proposals.4 Since the proof of proposition 5 uses
monotonici t y and independence only w.r.t the men’s preferences, it follows that if a
4The modified GSM is not symmetric. Since agents’ preferences are mechanism-dependent, the set of matchings that
can be supported by an equilibrium depends on the side of the market which makes the proposals.
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planner has reason to suspect that monotonici t y and independence are not satisfied by
the preferences of agents on one side of the market, then he can still choose the side of
the market making the proposals such that the modified GSM will produce only stable
matchings.
It is of interest to evaluate the performance of the modified GSM in the conventional
setup, in which agents’ preferences do not depend on the mechanism. Specifically, the
next proposition, together with proposition 5, shows that under the conventional settings
the modified GSM preserves the classic properties of the GSM.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider the modified GSM and suppose that for each i 2M [W
and Q;Q0 2 Q, Pi .Q/ D Pi
 Q0 D P 0i . Let  be a matching that is stable w.r.t P0.
There exists a profile of strategies Q such that Q is an equilibrium of 
 NQ; Ng;P0 and
Ng .Q/ D .
Since the conventional environment is a special case of this model, proposition 5 estab-
lishes that each matching which is the result of an equilibrium of the modified GSM’s in-
duced game is stable w.r.t the agents’ preferences and that the modified GSM is strategy-
proof for the men. By proposition 6, the modified GSM implements the stable correspon-
dence and therefore all of the GSM’s classic properties are preserved by its modification.
IV. Concluding remarks
The model presented is the first attempt to incorporate behavioral motives into match-
ing theory. In recent years, matching theory has became increasingly applied in practice.
The theoretical analysis presented here examines the mechanisms and concepts that have
been the focus of this literature for the past thirty years. It is essentially a generalization
of the two-sided matching problem and a robustness check for the mechanisms that are
used in practice. The results of the model’s analysis imply that privacy implications need
to be taken into consideration. It appears that stable matching mechanisms perform well
when information about the matching process is kept private. There are various settings
in which one might want the matching process to be transparent; however, in that case,
conventional mechanisms will fail.
Even if the matching process is kept confidential, the sensitivity of preferences to the
mechanism may be problematic since some of the messages may be deduced from the
mechanism’s outcomes. For example, a student who was put on a waiting list knows that
he is not top-ranked. An intern who is assigned to a hospital that he ranked fifth will
likely understand that he was not the first choice of his first choice. Moreover, it seems
plausible that some of the rankings will leak out of the system. For example, an intern
may find out the actual rankings of the hospital he was assigned to.
Another important theoretical remark concerns the revelation principle. The match-
ing mechanisms considered in this work are not direct mechanisms.5 In this paper’s
environment, an agent i’s "type" is a full description of the function Pi . When agent’s
5Conventional matching mechanisms are not direct mechanisms either.
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preferences depend on the mechanism, the function Pi changes when the mechanism is
changed and therefore the revelation principle is not well-defined and cannot be used.
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APPENDIX - PROOFS
PROPOSITION 1: For each individually rational matching mechanism hQ; gi, there
exists a profile of messages Q and a profile of preferences P such that Q is an equilib-
rium of the mechanism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROOF:
Let hQ; gi be an individually rational matching mechanism and let m 0 2M, w0 2W .
For each i 2 M [ W let Qi 2 Qi denote a message such that gi
 Qi ;Q i D i for








otherwise, and Pw0 .Q/ D
 
m 0; w0; :::

if Qm0 D




otherwise. For each j 2 M [W= m 0; w0	 and Q 2 Q
let Pj .Q/ D . j; :::/. Consider the profile of messages
 Qi i2M[W . First, note that
g .Q/ D  m 0; w0; ::: and that the pair  m 0; w0 blocks g .Q/ w.r.t P .Q/. Secondly, by
the individual rationality property, for each i 2 M [W , Qi is a best response to any
profile Q i 2 Q i and therefore it is not weakly dominated and Q is an equilibrium of
the mechanism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi.
LEMMA 1: Let hQ,g;Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making the
proposals and suppose that for a man m 2 M, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D NPm for each Q;Q0 2
Q. Then, Qm D NPm (i.e. truthful revelation of m’s preferences) weakly dominates any
other strategy Q0m 2 Qm .
PROOF:
Let hQ; g;Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making the proposals
and suppose that for a man m 2M, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D NPm for each Q;Q0 2 Q. Let
Q m 2 Q m be an arbitrary profile of strategies and consider a strategy Qm 6D NPm . As-
sume by negation that gm .Qm;Q m/ NPm gm
  NPm;Q m. Suppose that gm .Qm;Q m/ 2
W . By the algorithm, if m reports NPm , then he proposes to gm .Qm;Q m/ and is rejected
by her at some stage, a contradiction. Suppose that gm .Qm;Q m/ D m. This is a con-
tradiction since if m reports NPm , he does not propose to women who are an unacceptable
match for him.
It is left to show that there exists a profile Q m 2 Q m such that gm
  NPm;Q m NPm gm
.Qm;Q m/. Since Qm 6D NPm , there are three possible cases. In the first, there are two
women w;w0 2 W such that wQmw0, w0 NPmw and w NPmm. In that case, the strategyNPm does strictly better than the strategy Qm against a profile of strategies Q0 m such that









two complementary cases, there is a woman w 2 W such that m NPmw (w NPmm) and
wQmm (m Qmw). In those cases, the strategy NPm does strictly better than the strategy




and Q0j D . j; :::/ for
each j 2M [W= fm; wg. It follows that Qm is weakly dominated by NPm .
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PROPOSITION 2: Let hQ,g;Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making
the proposals and suppose that for each m 2 M and Q;Q0 2 Q, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D
Pm . If Q is an equilibrium of hQ,g;Pi, then g .Q/ is stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROOF:
Let hQ,g;Pi denote the game induced by the GSM with men making the proposals
and suppose that for each m 2 M and Q;Q0 2 Q, Pm .Q/ D Pm
 Q0 D Pm . As-
sume by negation that Q is an equilibrium of hQ,g;Pi and that g .Q/ is not stable
w.r.t P .Q/. It cannot be that g .Q/ is blocked by any individual i 2M [W since in
that case, i could profitably deviate to Q0i D .i; :::/. It must be that g .Q/ is blocked
by a pair .m; w/. Since Q is an equilibrium of hQ,g;Pi, by lemma 1, Qm D Pm .
Since .m; w/ form a blocking pair, wPm gm .Q/ and therefore w can submit a ranking
Q0w D .m; w; :::/ and marry m. Since .m; w/ form a blocking pair w.r.t P .Q/, it must be
that m Pw .Q/ gw .Q/ which is a contradiction of Q being an equilibrium of hQ; g;Pi.
PROPOSITION 3: Let jMj ; jWj  3. For each stable matching mechanism hQ; gi,
there exists a profile of strategies Q and a profile of preferences P that satisfies monotonic-
ity and independence such that Q is an equilibrium of the mechanism’s induced game
hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROOF:
This claim is proved by embedding a profile of preferences that is similar to the one
presented in example 5 within a larger market. Let hQ; gi be a stable matching mech-
anism and consider six agents fm1;m2;m3; w1; w2; w3g such that Pm1 D .w1;m1; :::/,
Pw1 D .m1; w1; :::/,
Pm2 .Q/ D

w1; w2; w3;m2; ::: if Qw2 D .m2; :::/





w1; w3; w2;m3; ::: if Qw3 D .m3; :::/





m1;m2;m3; w2; ::: if Qm2 D .w2; :::/





m1;m3;m2; w3; ::: if Qm3 D .w3; :::/
m1;m2;m3; w3; ::: otherwise

.
Suppose that for each i 2 M [W= fm1;m2;m3; w1; w2; w3g and Q 2 Q, Pi .Q/ D
.i; :::/. Clearly, independence is satisfied by the profile of preferences P. To see that
monotonici t y is also satisfied, we only need to check agents whose preferences are
not constant. Since there is symmetry between m2;m3; w2 and w3, we only present the
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argument for man m2. The only case in which m2 reverses his preference between two
women is a case in which woman w2 switches between two strategies: a strategy Qw2
which states that m2 is her first choice and another strategy Q0w2 which does not state
that. To see that the strategy Q0w2 is not at least as favorable to m2 as the strategy Qw2 ,
consider a profile of strategies Q w2 in which w2 is the first choice of each m 2M. By
the stability of hQ; gi, Qw2 matches w2 and m2 while Q0w2 does not. It follows that P
satisfies monotonici t y.
Consider the following profile of strategies: Qm1 D .w1;m1; :::/, Qm2 D .w1; w2; w3;
m2; :::/, Qm3 D .w1; w3; w2;m3; :::/, Qw1 D .m1; w1; :::/, Qw2 D .m1;m2;m3; w2; :::/,Qw3 D .m1;m3;m2; w3; :::/, and Qi D .i; :::/ for each i 2M[W= fm1;m2;m3; w1; w2; w3g.
By the stability of hQ; gi, g .Q/ D ..m1; w1/ ; .m2; w2/ ; .m3; w3/ ; :::/. Note that agent
k 2M[W= fm2;m3; w2; w3g is matched to his first choice and therefore cannot gain by
a deviation. By the stability of hQ; gi and given Q  j , each agent j 2 fm2;m3; w2; w3g
cannot deviate and marry another agent. It follows that Q is a Nash equilibrium of
hQ; g;Pi.
It is left to show that each Qi 2 Q is not dominated. For each i 2M [W , a strategy
Qi that ranks i’s first choice first is not dominated by a strategy that does not, since it
does strictly better against a profile of strategies in which i is everyone else’s first choice.
Again, due to the symmetry between m2;m3; w2 and w3, the following argument is pre-
sented only for man m2. For m2, ranking w2 second (and w1 first) does strictly better
than any other strategy that ranks w1 first (and w2 lower than second) against a profile of
strategies in which m1 and w1 report each other as first choices and each w 2 W= fw1g
ranks m2 as her first choice. A similar argument applies to Qm2 ranking w3 third and
other women as unacceptable. It follows that Q does not involve the use of weakly
dominated strategies and therefore it is an equilibrium and g .Q/ is blocked by .m2; w3/
and .m3; w2/.
PROPOSITION 4: Let jMj ; jWj  3. For each monotonic priority matching mech-
anism hQ; gi, there exists a profile of strategies Q and a profile of preferences P that
satisfies monotonicity and independence such that Q is an equilibrium of the mecha-
nism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROOF:
Let hQ; gi be a monotonic priority matching mechanism and let jMj ; jWj  3.
Consider the following profile of strategies Q: For j 2 M [ W= fm1;m2; w1; w2g,
Qj D . j; :::/, Qm1 D .w1; w2;m1; :::/, Qm2 D .w2;m2; :::/, Qw1 D .m1; w1; :::/ andQw2 D .m2;m1; w2; :::/. By the monotonicity of .Q; g/, .1; 1/ matches are formed be-
fore any others and therefore g .Q/ D ..m1; w1/ ; .m2; w2/ ;m3; w3; :::/ is the matching
that results from Q.
Consider the following profile of preferences: Pj .Q/ D . j; :::/ for each Q 2 Q and
j 2M[W= fm1;m2; w1; w2g. For each Q 2 Q and i 2 fm2; w1g, Pi D .gi .Q/ ; i; :::/.
Man m1’s preferences are Pm1 .Q/ D .w2; w1;m1; :::/ if w2 reports that he is at least
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her second choice and Pm1 .Q/ D .w1; w2;m1; :::/ otherwise. Woman w2’s preferences
are Pw2 .Q/ D .m1;m2; w2; :::/ if m1 reports that she is at least his second choice and
Pw2 .Q/ D .m2;m1; w2; :::/ otherwise. Clearly, independence is satisfied by P. By the
monotonicity of hQ; gi, monotonici t y is satisfied by P. Also, by the monotonicity of
hQ; gi, .1; 1/ matches are formed before any others and therefore Q is a Nash equilib-
rium of hQ; g;Pi. It is easy to see that the pair .m1; w2/ blocks g .Q/. It is left to verify
that Q does not include dominated strategies.
For each i 2 M [ W= fm1; w2g, Qi cannot be dominated by another strategy Q0i
since it is a best response to any profile of opponents’ strategies. It is left to verify
that Qw2 and Qm1 are not dominated. Since the argument for Qw2 is identical, we only
need to check Qm1 . The strategy Qm1 cannot be dominated by a strategy Q0m1 that reports
w 2W= fw1; w2g as an acceptable match since Qm1 does strictly better than Q0m1 against
a profile of strategies in which each w0 2 W= fwg reports m1 as an unacceptable match
and Qw D .m1; w; :::/. Also, the strategy Qm1 cannot be dominated by a strategy Q0m1
that reports that w 2 fw1; w2g is an unacceptable match since Qm1 does strictly better
than Q0m1 against a profile of strategies in which each w0 2 W= fwg reports m1 as an
unacceptable match and Qw D .m1; w; :::/. Finally, Qm1 cannot be dominated by a
strategy Q0m1 that ranks w2 first since Qm1 does strictly better than Q0m1 against a profile
of strategies in which each w 2 W= fw1; w2g reports m1 as an unacceptable match,
w1 and w2 report that m1 is their third choice and each m 2 M= fm1g reports each
w 2 fw1; w2g as an unacceptable match. It follows that Q is a an equilibrium of the
mechanism’s induced game hQ; g;Pi and g .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that Q is an equilibrium of the game that is induced by
the modified GSM 
 NQ; Ng;P. If P satisfies monotonicity and independence, then Ng .Q/ is
stable w.r.t P .Q/.
PROOF:
Consider the modified GSM

 NQ; Ng. For each man m 2M, define Tm 2 NQm to be m’s
strict preferences over W [ fmg given that for each w 2 W , Qw D m. We now claim
that any strategy Qm 2 NQm that ranks women who are an acceptable match according to
Tm differently than Tm or reports women who are an acceptable (unacceptable) match ac-
cording to Tm as an unacceptable (acceptable) match is weakly dominated by the strategy
Qm D Tm .
Consider an arbitrary profile Q m 2 NQ m and assume by negation that there exists
a strategy Q0m 2 NQm such that Ngm
 Q0m;Q m Pm  Q0m;Q m Ngm .Tm;Q m/. It cannot
be that Ngm
 Q0m;Q m D m since by independence, mTm Ngm .Tm;Q m/. Also, it cannot
be that Ngm .Tm;Q m/ D m since it implies that Q Ngm.Q0m ;Q m/ D m and by independence,
Ngm
 Q0m;Q m Tmm which is a contradiction. It follows that Ngm  Q0m;Q m ; Ngm .Tm;Q m/2 W . Moreover, it must be that Q Ngm.Q0m ;Q m/ D Q Ngm .Tm ;Q m / D m. By independence,
it must be that Ngm
 Q0m;Q m Tm Ngm .Tm;Q m/. It follows that under Tm , m proposes
to Ngm
 Q0m;Q m before proposing to Ngm .Tm;Q m/ and is rejected by Ngm  Q0m;Q m,
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which is a contradiction since Q Ngm.Q0m ;Q m/ D m. It follows that Tm is a best response to
any Q m 2 Q m .
It is left to show that there exists a profile Q m 2 Q m such that Tm does strictly better
than Q0m against Q m . There are three possible cases. First, suppose that Q0m 6D Tm re-
ports a womanw 2W who is an unacceptable (acceptable) match by Tm as an acceptable
(unacceptable) match. By independence, w is unacceptable (acceptable) for m when-
ever Qw D m. Clearly, Tm does strictly better than Q0m against a profile Q0 m 2 Q m in
which Q0w D m and Q0w0 6D m for each w0 2W= fwg. For the complementary case, sup-
pose that there are two women w;w0 2 W such that w0Tmm, wTmw0 and w0Q0mw. The
strategy Tm does strictly better than the strategy Q0m against a profile Q m 2 Q m such






 Q0m;Q mw0. It follows that Tm weakly dominates any other strat-
egy Q0m 2 NQm .
Let Q be an equilibrium of the mechanism’s induced game 
 NQ; Ng;P. Suppose that
Ng .Q/ is not stable w.r.t P .Q/. By the individual rationality property of the mechanism,
Ng .Q/ must be blocked by a pair .m; w/. It follows that wPm
 Qw;Q w Ngm .Q/. By
monotonici t y, wPm
 
m;Q w
 Ngm .Q/ and by independence, wTm Ngm .Q/. It follows




which contradicts Q being an equilibrium of 
 NQ; Ng;P since
woman w can deviate profitably and marry man m.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider the modified GSM and suppose that for each i 2M [W
and Q;Q0 2 Q, Pi .Q/ D Pi
 Q0 D P 0i . Let  be a matching that is stable w.r.t P0.
There exists a profile of strategies Q such that Q is an equilibrium of 
 NQ; Ng;P0 and
Ng .Q/ D .
PROOF:
Consider the modified GSM

 NQ; Ng and suppose that for each i 2M[W and Q;Q0 2
Q, Pi .Q/ D Pi
 Q0 D P 0i . Let  be a matching that is stable w.r.t P0. Let Qm D P 0m
for each m 2M and let Qw D  .w/ for each w 2 W such that  .w/ 6D w. For each
w 2 W such that  .w/ D w, let Qw be a man m 2M who is an acceptable match for
her w.r.t P 0w. If such a man does not exist, then let Qw D w:
We now prove that Ng .Q/ D  by showing that m D  .w/ if and only if m D
Ngw .Q/. First, suppose that m 6D  .w/, then by construction of Q, m D Ngw .Q/
implies that wP 0m .m/,  .w/ D w and m P 0ww which contradicts the stability of  w.r.t
P0. Secondly, suppose that w D  .m/ and w 6D Ngm .Q/. By the construction of Q,





stability of  w.r.t P0. Also, by the construction of Q, Ngm .Q/ D m implies that m P 0mw
which contradicts the stability of  w.r.t P0.
It remains to prove that Q is an equilibrium of 
 NQ; Ng;P0. It follows from Dubins and
Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) that each Qm 2 Q is a best reply to Q m and that
Qm 2 Q is not dominated by any other Qm 2 Qm . Each Qw 2 Q such that Qw 2M
is not dominated since it does strictly better than any other strategy against a profile of




and Qm D .m; :::/ for each m 2 M=
Qw	.
By the construction of Q, each Qw 2 Q such that Qw D w is a best response to any
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Q w 2 Q w since each m 2M is an unacceptable match for w. The stability of  w.r.t
P0 along with QM D P0M imply that if a woman w 2W deviates from Qw to Q0w 2 Qw
she cannot marry a man m 2M such that m P 0w .w/ and therefore neither of the women
has a profitable deviation. It follows that Q is an equilibrium of 
 NQ; Ng;P0.
